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Informal Conflict Management in Exclusivist Political 
Orders: Some Observations on Central Mindanao 
Jeroen Adam & Boris Verbrugge
► Adam, J., & Verbrugge, B. (2014). Informal conflict management in exclusivist political orders: Some ob-
servations on Central Mindanao. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(1), 61-74. 
In the past decade, a range of international and national NGOs have pointed to the need 
to complement national-level negotiations with a support for alternative, informal in-
stitutions of conflict management in order to reach a sustainable peace in the conflict-
affected regions of Central and Western Mindanao. This argument is based on emerging 
insights into the multi-layered conflict ecology in the region and the fact that classic stat-
ist diplomacy can only deal with this complexity to a limited extent. Based on an analysis 
of existing conflict management practices in the region, we would like to challenge some 
of the basic premises underlying this ‘alternative’ and informal approach. Our core argu-
ment is that in the case of Mindanao, assuming a rigid distinction between formal and 
informal actors and practices of conflict mediation is flawed and may actually be coun-
terproductive, as it obscures how informal practices dominate purportedly formal media-
tion procedures. Moreover, it tends to underestimate how the local executive embodying 
state power plays a key role in allegedly ‘informal’ conflict management mechanisms.  
Keywords: Conflict Management; Informality; Mindanao; Peace Studies; the Philippines

In den letzten Jahren hat eine Reihe von internationalen und nationalen NROs darauf 
hingewiesen, dass Verhandlungen auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene durch alternative, infor-
melle Institutionen des Konfliktmanagements unterstützt werden müssen, um nachhal-
tigen Frieden in den Konfliktregionen von Zentral- und West-Mindanao zu erreichen. 
Dieses Argument basiert auf jüngsten Einsichten über die Vielschichtigkeit der Konflikt-
dimensionen in der Region und dem Faktum, dass klassische nationalstaatliche Diplo-
matie im Umgang mit dieser Komplexität begrenzt ist. Basierend auf einer Analyse von 
bestehenden Praktiken des Konfliktmanagements in der Region möchten wir einige der 
grundlegenden Prämissen, die diesem „alternativen“ und informellen Ansatz zu Grunde 
liegen, in Frage stellen. Unser zentrales Argument ist, dass die Annahme einer rigiden 
Trennung zwischen formellen und informellen AkteurInnen und Praktiken der Konflikt-
mediation im Fall von Mindanao mangelhaft und möglicherweise sogar kontraproduk-
tiv ist, weil sie verschleiert, wie informelle Praktiken vorgeblich formelle Mediations- 
prozesse dominieren. Zudem unterschätzt eine solche Trennung, wie die lokale Exeku-
tive als Verkörperung von Staatsmacht eine Schlüsselrolle darin spielt, welche scheinbar 
„informellen“ Mechanismen des Konfliktmanagements geltend gemacht werden.
Schlagworte: Friedensforschung; Informalität; Konfliktmanagement; Mindanao;  
Philippinen
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INTRODUCTION
The southern Philippine island of Mindanao faces one of the longest-running vio-
lent conflicts in the world. Starting in the late 1960s with clashes between Christian 
and Muslim armed militias, already by the early 1970s the conflict had escalated into 
a full-scale war between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF, the main rep-
resentative of the minority Muslim population at the time) and the Philippine army 
(Dañguiland & Gloria, 2000; McKenna, 1998, pp. 138–156). In later stages of the con-
flict, new rebel movements emerged, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
in particular proving to be a serious contender to the traditional MNLF hegemony. 
Although the MNLF and the MILF are no longer officially at war with the Philippine 
state at the time of writing, sporadic outbursts of violence between the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) and these rebel groups still occur on a regular basis. Further-
more, a counterinsurgency campaign is ongoing against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 
a small but highly mediatized terrorist group that rose to prominence after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. In addition, as recently as 2008, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Fighters (BIFF) were established as a radicalized breakaway faction from the MILF, 
disenchanted with the ongoing negotiations between the MILF and the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).
This decades-long history of violence and confrontation coincided with protract-
ed rounds of peace negotiations. Already in 1976, the Philippine state and the MNLF 
reached a ceasefire agreement, the so-called Tripoli agreement (Özerdem, 2012). 
However, it was only following a plebiscite in 1989 that the Autonomous Region for 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created, albeit as a much smaller geographic entity 
than originally envisioned in the 1976 agreement. In 1996, a final peace agreement 
was signed between the MNLF and the GRP (Bertrand, 2000). This peace agreement 
provided for the disarmament and reintegration of MNLF fighters, although it did 
not manage to prevent further confrontations between MNLF factions and the AFP.1 
Meanwhile, soon after the 1996 agreement with the MNLF, preliminary talks started 
with the MILF (International Crisis Group, 2008). Despite some major setbacks (Wil-
liams, 2010), often followed by a period of open warfare, talks between the GRP and 
the MILF have now reached an advanced stage with the signing of the Framework 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and four annexes, as recently as January 2014. 
While important challenges remain with regards to the further fine-tuning and im-
plementation of this agreement, it has nonetheless enabled a rapprochement and a 
stabilization of relations between the MILF and the Philippine state.2 
1 One recent example is the audacious attack by 200 MNLF fighters on the city of Zamboanga on 8 Sep-
tember 2013. These events should be understood against the background of the current talks between the 
GRP and the MILF, whereby some MNLF leaders feel anxious about their potential political sidelining in 
the future Bangsamoro autonomous region. This was in particular the case for a group of MNLF members 
around former ARMM Governor Nur Misuari who mainly originate from the island of Sulu. It needs to 
be stressed that other important MNLF leaders have condemned the attack and that there was no direct 
support among MNLF communities in mainland Mindanao (“Sema’s MNLF faction”, 2013).
2 The last big hurdle that remains is to write up a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) wherein the promulga-
tions made within the FAB and the four annexes will be integrated and the institutional structure of the 
future Bangsamoro will be further refined. Considering the positive atmosphere that has surrounded the 
recent consultations between the MILF and the GRP, it is generally expected that this BBL will be finished 
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Notwithstanding the notable progress made in these negotiations, important 
questions remain with regards to their impact on the everyday security situation in 
Mindanao, where a broad variety of local conflicts continue to proliferate. This obser-
vation is related to critical insights that have emerged in recent years about the highly 
complex, multi-layered conflict ecology in the region (Adam, 2013; Lara & Champain, 
2009). By tackling only one aspect of this conflict ecology, namely the ‘master narra-
tive’ of Muslim struggles for autonomy, national-level statist diplomacy is inevitably 
limited in scope. For these reasons, a range of NGOs and international organizations 
are now pointing towards the need to complement these national-level negotiations 
with alternative conflict management practices that rely disproportionately on non-
state, informal institutions of conflict management (Centre for Humanitarian Dia-
logue, 2011; Human Development Network, 2005; The Asia Foundation [TAF], 2011). 
These informal institutions are said to be not only socially legitimized, but also better 
equipped to deal with localized violent disputes. Based on an analysis of existing con-
flict management practices in Mindanao,3 however, we would like to challenge some 
of the basic premises underlying this ‘alternative’ approach. Our core argument is 
that in the case of Mindanao, assuming a rigid distinction between formal and infor-
mal actors and practices of conflict mediation is not only unhelpful, but may even be 
counterproductive, as it obscures how informal practices dominate purportedly for-
mal mediation procedures and, perhaps more fundamentally, how the local executive 
embodying state power plays a key role in allegedly ‘informal’ conflict management 
mechanisms.
In the following section, we will provide some critical observations regarding the 
complex conflict ecology in Western and Central Mindanao, and how a growing ac-
ceptance of this complexity is feeding into support for alternative, informal conflict 
management mechanisms. The third section will investigate the alleged shortcom-
ings of ‘formal’ conflict mediation mechanisms. It will be argued that these ‘formal’ 
mechanisms in effect exhibit a high degree of informality, in the form of amicable 
settlement practices and a high degree of personal influence on the part of local ex-
ecutives. The fourth section will turn to a brief evaluation of three dispute settlement 
mechanisms that explicitly aim to transcend formal state structures by including 
non-state actors. It will be suggested that the local executive plays a key role in these 
allegedly ‘informal’ or hybrid mechanisms, both as a vital source of coercive power 
and legitimacy.
by early 2015 at the latest. The biggest difficulty will lie in the ratification by the Philippine Congress 
without invoking too many fundamental amendments that would weaken the BBL. In case of successful 
ratification, it is expected that before the ending of the Aquino administration in 2016, a new Bangsamoro 
will be installed which will incorporate the current ARMM.
3 For this article, we draw on an analysis of a diverse range of conflict management interventions in 
Western and Central Mindanao, with a specific focus on the province of North Cotabato. These different 
interventions, ranging from big international programs such as one supported by The Asia Foundation 
to localized initiatives operating on a limited geographical scale, have been researched over the past year 
throughout different fieldwork periods in the region. The methodology consists of a combination of in-
depth interviews with different stakeholders, participant observation, and analysis of written documents 
(e.g., policy reports, evaluations, pamphlets).
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COMPLEX CONFLICT ECOLOGIES AND THE RISE OF THE INFORMAL
In recent years, there has been growing awareness that armed confrontations be-
tween the AFP and Muslim armed groups over the specific interpretations and mo-
dalities of autonomy constitute only a minor portion of the actual violence (Lara & 
Champain, 2009, pp. 8–9; Torres, 2007). Instead, the majority of violent conflict in 
the region should be understood as part and parcel of struggles for control over the 
local political economy. Significant in this regard is the high incidence of what has 
been described as ‘warlord politics’, an ultimately coercive and oftentimes-violent 
form of electoral competition, often built around kinship networks. While this obser-
vation is by no means unique in the Philippine setting (Sidel, 1999), it is exceptional 
that this coercive form of political-electoral contestation interacts in highly complex 
ways “with a second form of political violence not encountered in other regions of 
the Philippines – that of the armed struggle for independence” (Kreuzer, 2005, p. 4). 
This results in a highly complex conflict ecology, as violent struggles play out between 
different kin-based groups, can obtain both an inter- and intra-religious framing, and 
result in an intricate web of small-scale, yet often protracted, violent disputes that 
do not necessarily follow the national framing of the conflict (Adam, 2013). Further-
more, rather than a neat dichotomy between the ‘local’ and ‘the national’, different 
scales of violence and oftentimes-coercive authority interact in highly complex ways 
wherein MNLF or MILF commanders deploy their capacity for violence in localized 
struggles over resources and political office. Ultimately, the causes of violence in the 
region are more diverse and complex than merely conflicting opinions on the legal 
status of an autonomous Muslim entity. As such, and without wanting to question 
its relevance, national-level diplomacy has clear limitations, as it targets only one 
particular aspect of this complex conflict ecology.
Based on this observation, a range of researchers, NGOs, and international or-
ganizations have pointed to the need to complement these national-level negotia-
tions with a support for alternative, in particular non-state or informal, institutions 
of conflict management in order to reach true, sustainable peace in the region.4 This 
argument is underpinned by two broad rationales. First, unlike ‘statist’, formal, and 
distant national-level negotiations, informal institutions are considered to have 
strong social embeddedness and legitimacy. For instance, in a paper on civil society 
in Mindanao based on a case study in Pikit, North Cotabato, Neumann (2010) argues 
that local, civil-society based organizations and institutions are more effective and 
flexible in handling conflict and violence when compared to the many (failed) nation-
al, top-down efforts to implement peace in the region. The Institute for Autonomy 
and Governance at Notre Dame University in Cotabato City makes a similar point 
when it considers community-based conflict resolution and inter-faith dialogue as 
a fundamental part in building a ‘cultural basis’ for socially-embedded peace (Bacani 
& Mercado, 2009; Mendoza, 2010). In the 2005 Philippine Human Development Re-
4 Conflict management is understood as a range of different approaches and programs focused on con-
taining violence during the actual conflict. This distinguishes conflict management from other activities 
such as conflict prevention or post-conflict reconciliation (World Bank, 2006). The strategies and institu-
tions of conflict management we elaborate on in this article are in particular focused on a quick settlement 
of small-scale violent disputes.
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port (Human Development Network, 2005), it is stated that “peace talks by them-
selves are unlikely to prosper” (p. 45) as these are only conducted by a selective group 
of “designated specialists” (p. 35). Therefore, it is important that these are supported 
by a broad popular constituency, consisting of a diversity of pro-peace civil society 
organizations that can monitor the peace process. A second rationale, which is stated 
in the same report, claims that these civil society organizations are better placed to 
deal with everyday violence and tensions at the micro-level of society. For this rea-
son, national-level talks on the ‘secessionist question’ should be complemented with 
support for informal strategies and actors of conflict management, focused on every-
day violence rooted in struggles over the local political economy. For instance, the 
Swiss-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2011) makes a plea to actively sup-
port so-called “indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms” (p. 54) as these are better 
suited than formal local government units to settle disputes at the micro-level of 
society. This rationale also became apparent when studying the so-called hybrid co-
alition approach of conflict management deployed by The Asia Foundation in differ-
ent conflict-affected places in Mindanao. The Asia Foundation is an American NGO 
and one of the most important players in the NGO landscape in Central and Western 
Mindanao where they have a widespread conflict management program through 13 
partner organizations. When studying the basic rationale behind this program, some 
interesting issues can be noted. First of all, this approach is conceived of as a hybrid 
approach because it seeks to combine formal and informal actors and institutions of 
conflict management (TAF, 2011, p. 2). In everyday programs, however, the informal 
sphere is particularly emphasized as a resource from which very efficient mechanisms 
for conflict management can be derived. In general, it is argued that informal institu-
tions and actors of conflict management have a stronger social embeddedness and 
legitimacy and are therefore more effective in settling and resolving local violent con-
flicts. This argument is also related with the assumption that formal institutions are 
ineffective in dealing with local disputes. Formal state institutions, apart from being 
subject to mismanagement and large-scale corruption, may be too slow and weak and 
therefore ineffective in conflict-affected regions in Mindanao (TAF, 2011, p. 25). This 
is then contrasted with the very flexible character of the informal institutions and 
actors, which do not require endless hearings, review processes, or the submission of 
different documents to formal courts.
Importantly, these arguments resonate with a broader, global tendency to down-
scale strategies of conflict management and peace building and to include non-state 
actors and informal institutions within these strategies (Anderson, Olson, & Doughty, 
2003; Lederach, 1997). This view is also shared by prominent international organiza-
tions including the UN Secretary General (2001), the World Bank (2006), and USAID 
(2001). The underlying arguments for this trend can be categorized into three broad 
streams. A first line stresses the restricted reach of conflict management initiatives 
within the formal state as they engage only elites through power-sharing initiatives. 
The best-known proponent of this argument is Jean Paul Lederach (1997) who criti-
cizes “traditional statist diplomacy” (p. xvi) and proposes a more holistic approach 
that puts human relations at the center of analysis (see in particular Chapter 5 and 
6). A second line of explanations stresses the limited capacity of the formal state to 
deliver sustainable resolutions to disputes in conflict-affected regions. Therefore, as 
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an alternative to – or in collaboration with– this weak state, alternative and non-state 
conflict management institutions should be supported. For instance, a study by Ken 
Menkaus (2008) describes how in a northern Kenyan context characterized by weak 
state performance and chronic, low-intensity violence, an informal alliance sprang 
up, led by a women’s market group which was instrumental in settling disputes. In 
the longer term, this informal alliance merged with the formal state resulting in a 
“civic-government partnership” (p. 26). According to Menkhaus, despite some short-
comings, the emergence of these sorts of partnerships has resulted in “impressive 
gains in public security and conflict management” (p. 33). A third line of arguments 
states that informal institutions of conflict management are more socially embed-
ded and therefore more flexible and easier to apply compared to formal, state-led 
mechanisms which are considered to be more static and artificial. For this reason, 
it is more cost-efficient for international organizations to support informal dispute 
settlement mechanisms instead of investing in costly and time-consuming formal 
institutions. For instance, in the case of Somalia, Menkhaus (2006/2007) highlights 
organic sources of local governance in conflict management and dispute settlement 
and contrasts this with inorganic and top-down formal state building processes that 
are highly artificial, top-down, time-consuming, and ultimately bound to fail.
‘FORMAL’ CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND THE UBIQUITY OF  
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
Before problematizing the formal-informal dichotomy, it is important to note 
that the formal justice system in Mindanao is indeed curtailed by a range of factors, 
which limit access to formal adjudication for ordinary citizens. First of all, engaging 
the formal judiciary is expensive. Secondly, judicial procedures are notoriously slow, 
and judges often fall prey to intimidation or political pressure. Thirdly, accessibility 
for ordinary citizens, particularly those in the countryside, is hampered by mobil-
ity constraints. Due to these problems of inaccessibility, exclusivity, and illegitima-
cy of the formal justice system, in particular for the rural marginalized population 
(Franco, 2008, p. 1860), citizens in rural areas have long reverted to local, traditional 
methods to process disputes. While there is a great degree of variation in ‘traditional’ 
settlement practices, they are broadly known as ‘amicable settlements’. Despite this 
significant degree of variation, some general observations can be made with regard 
to the process of amicable settlement (Latip, 2012; Libre, 2012). It typically involves 
mediation by a third party that commands an authoritative position in the commu-
nity. Regarding settlement and punishment, some case studies mentioned dramatic 
solutions such as lashing or even the death penalty (Montillo-Burton, Matuan, Po-
ingan, & Alovera, 2007), but the more common practice is a compensation payment 
by the offender. Where people have been killed in a dispute, this will typically be in 
the form of blood money, the actual amount of which depends on a variety of factors 
and is subject to negotiation. In some instances, however, the mediator unilaterally 
dictates the amount that needs to be paid. Traditional authorities, particularly the 
Council of Elders, are often imbued with a central role in amicable dispute settle-
ment. They are referred to as a highly authoritative body rooted in the traditional 
clan system. Given their authoritative position, the scope of their interventions can 
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and often does transcend small conflicts, as elders also deal with major issues like 
rape or murder. However, defining traditional authority and traditional conflict 
settlement is difficult, all the more because traditional conflict management has be-
come increasingly entangled with formal state institutions. The historical tradition 
of amicable settlement inspired former President Marcos to create the Katarungan 
Pambarangay or Barangay Justice through Presidential Decree 1508 (PD1508) in 1978 
(Republic of the Philippines, 1978).5 After the end of martial law, Barangay Justice 
was enshrined in the Local Government Code. Formally, mediation in Barangay Jus-
tice takes place under the administrative supervision of the Lupon, a body composed 
of 10 to 20 residents appointed by and presided over by the village chairman. Any 
conflict within its jurisdiction should pass through the Katarungan Pambarangay; 
the village chairman will refer a dispute to the formal judiciary only where it is in-
capable or not mandated to intervene. Any settlement reached is also binding upon 
the conflicting parties. PD1508 was meant to recognize and as such reinforce the 
process of amicable settlement, which could represent a flexible, culturally sensitive, 
and discrete alternative for the slow and congested formal judiciary. Simultaneously, 
PD1508 was clearly geared at integrating amicable settlement within formal state in-
stitutions, and the village chairman came to occupy a pivotal position at the expense 
of other (traditional) political elites (Golub, 2003; Siliman, 1985). This did not mean 
that traditional-religious authority was completely sidelined. Instead, there is a kind 
of symbiosis – often defined in terms of ‘mutual respect’ – between traditional au-
thorities and formal state authorities. The common practice is for the village chair-
man to ask the influential clans – or at least those supporting his/her administration 
– to endorse one or more representatives to the Lupon.
Before moving on to discuss more ‘informal’ mechanisms of conflict manage-
ment, it is worthwhile to briefly consider another body first created by the Marcos 
regime (through Executive Order 727) and later reorganized by democratically elect-
ed governments: the Peace and Order Councils (Republic of the Philippines, 1981). 
These councils are organized at different levels of government, including the mu-
nicipal and village level (in villages, it is called the Peace and Order Committee). They 
are composed of the counterparts of government agencies operating at the respec-
tive government level, and they are chaired by the chief executive (mayor or village 
chairman). Significantly, there is also a mandatory representation of civil society. In 
theory, the Municipal Peace and Order Committee addresses issues of security that 
concern the entire village or more. The legal mandate of the Peace and Order Coun-
cils/Committee (in its latest form, i.e., Executive Order 773) is heavily informed by 
counterinsurgency concerns, in particular against the communist New People’s Army 
(NPA). For instance, it literally states that it can impose sanctions against local chief 
executives supporting NPA rebels and even attempts to
monitor the provision of livelihood and infrastructure development programs 
and projects in the remote rural and indigenous population areas adopted 
to isolate them from the Communist rebels’ “Agitate/Arouse, Organize and 
Mobilize” and ideological, political and organization works. (Republic of the  
Philippines, 2009)
5 Barangay is the lowest administrative unit in the Philippines.
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This preoccupation with counter-insurgency might hamper its work in terms of 
dispute settlement, since many of the conflicts involve people with (in)direct ties to 
a rebel movement. Furthermore, several respondents indicated that the effectiveness 
of the Peace and Order Councils/Committees depended on the willingness of the 
local executive to dispense vital resources. For example, in several instances respon-
dents suggested that the local executive was using state resources to compensate vic-
tims of a local feud (so-called ‘blood money’) in an effort to appease the situation. 
Perhaps more importantly, the local executive commands what several respondents 
referred to as ‘policing power’. This is in line with a more general, albeit crucial obser-
vation, namely that local executives in the Philippines command – partly as a result 
of American colonialism – a high degree of control over the local means of violence 
(Hedman & Sidel, 2000; Hutchcroft, 2000; Sidel, 1999). While these typically include 
private political armies, this control extends into the realms of the state-sanctioned 
means of violence, with local executives exerting a high degree of control over (ba-
rangay) police and even (para)military units operating within their jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, it has already been indicated earlier that several local executives cultivate 
ties with one of the rebel groups.
To summarize, supposedly informal amicable settlement procedures have long 
been ‘colonized’ by the formal sphere (read: the state). Meanwhile, existing formal 
procedures exhibit a high degree of ‘informality’: not only are they geared towards 
the amicable settlement of disputes through third-party intervention, there is also a 
high degree of personal influence on the part of a local executive that commands vital 
financial and coercive resources. This observation is particularly problematic in those 
localities marked by a high degree of political factionalism and even political feuding.
THE FORMAL IN THE INFORMAL: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ALTERNATIVE  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT EFFORTS
Crucially, this tendency toward executive dominance is not limited to the formal 
sphere, but is also apparent in purportedly ‘informal’ mechanisms of conflict man-
agement. Some local government units have created structures to provide more room 
for informal (traditional) dispute settlement, e.g., the mayor’s council in Upi, a mu-
nicipality in the province of Maguindanao. This council is composed of two Muslim 
representatives, two indigenous representatives, and two Christian representatives 
(Husin, 2010). It was created per municipal ordinance by the mayor of Upi and was 
meant to strengthen formal mediation through the recognition and incorporation 
of traditional, more culturally sensitive mechanisms of conflict mediation. As the 
name suggests, the local executive in the person of the mayor retains a high degree 
of discretion over the mayor’s council, and will be firmly in charge of the settlement 
process and the selection of council members.
Another example is that of NATULARAN MU,6 a local dispute settlement alli-
ance composed of six conflict-affected barangays that was established in 2006 with 
support from Integral Development Services Philippines and the German Techni-
6 NATULARAN MU is an acronym which stands for the villages in Midsayap: Nabalawag, Tugal, Lower 
Glad, Rangeban, Nes, and Mudseng. All these villages are represented in this dispute settlement body.
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cal Cooperation (HIPEC, 2011, pp. 94–95). This mechanism convenes the barangay 
captains in the volatile municipality of Midsayap, North Cotabato, and was meant to 
collaborate with various other stakeholders, including NGOs. Like the mayor’s coun-
cil in Upi, the municipal mayor also supported NATULARAN MU by recognizing it 
through municipal resolutions and the creation of a monitoring team. It should also 
be noted that this alliance was set up by Tubog Pulalan, a village chairman that had 
emerged as the local ‘strongman’ following years of violent competition between dif-
ferent political and electoral alliances, all of which cultivated ties with the Muslim 
rebel movements active in the area. ‘Kumander’ Tubog himself was also a known 
rebel commander who had first served in the MNLF before joining the MILF. There-
fore, he already wielded significant coercive power before extending his grip over 
village politics. When he, his wife, and some of his close allies started to dominate 
barangay politics in the area, this coercive capacity was gradually absorbed and legiti-
mated by the state, as Tubog started appointing several of his men as barangay police 
(also known as ‘civilian volunteers’). Instead of perceiving this coercive capacity as a 
problem, some of the people engaged in NATULARAN MU emphasized that Tubog’s 
consolidation of power was precisely the reason why he became president of the al-
liance. Soon after its establishment in early 2006, however, Tubog was killed on 19 
April 2006, allegedly by one of his many rivals in Midsayap (Unson, 2006). Nonethe-
less, the case of NATULARAN MU and its leader, Tubog, is a potent illustration of the 
role of the local executive in conflict management, and how this is intimately related 
to their coercive capacity.
A final illustration of this mutual involvement of conflict management institu-
tions and state politics comes from the barangay of Nabalawag, North Cotabato. 
Here, a youth organization – United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD) 
with close ties to the MILF – played an important role in the settlement of a long-
running violent feud among different families that revolved around land disputes 
that had escalated as part of a broader power struggle between two village chair-
men. These chairmen acted simultaneously as commanders in the area. Killings and 
land grabbing by both sides had led to an overall climate of insecurity and distrust. 
UNYPAD members, with the assistance of The Asia Foundation, set up a Quick Re-
sponse Team (QRT), which cleared the ground for negotiations between the two 
parties by approaching the family elders and commanders to hear their demands. 
Subsequently, the QRT met with the village chairman in order to establish a strategy 
for further negotiations between the parties and different stakeholders. By involving 
village officials, the municipal mayor, the MILF, and the Philippine military in the 
mediation process, the warring parties were eventually pushed towards an agreement 
(UNYPAD, 2007). When analyzing this intervention, two factors emerged as particu-
larly important in explaining its success. First, several members of the UNYPAD QRT 
were members of or had connections to the village council, which tremendously 
reinforced their credibility and authority as mediators. This is closely related to a 
second observation, namely that the recognition and approval of the QRT’s work by 
the municipal local government unit, the state security sector, and the MILF imbued 
the mediators not only with policing power, but also with vital credibility and legiti-
macy. On the downside, however, QRT members admitted that this support came at 
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a price, with its mediation work depending on the approval and support of existing 
elite networks and, to a lesser extent, also NGOs.
CONCLUSION
The entrance point of this article was the observation that in response to an in-
creased understanding about the complex and multidimensional nature of violent 
conflict in Mindanao, a growing number of scholars and development practitioners 
have pinned their hopes on informal conflict management mechanisms that explic-
itly seek to include non-state actors and institutions in the mediation and settlement 
of conflicts. Through an analysis of existing formal and informal conflict manage-
ment practices, we have attempted to illustrate how such a rigid distinction between 
formal and informal institutions is misleading. On the one hand, what is usually 
described as formal has significant informal traits. On the other hand, purportedly 
informal actors and institutions have intricate ties with the formal sphere and derive 
much of their authority, legitimacy, and policing power from the state as embodied 
by the local executive.
These observations about the dominant role of the local executive in conflict me-
diation are in line with the broader literature on state-society relations in the Philip-
pines. There, it has been argued that control over (local) state institutions represents 
a vital source of coercive power, with the local executive retaining a high degree of 
control over state-sanctioned means of violence (Kreuzer, 2009; Sidel, 1999). Fur-
thermore, access to the realms of the state also represents an important source of 
legitimacy, strengthening or even replacing more traditional sources of public au-
thority (Abinales, 2000; Wong, 2006). Mindanao is no exception in this regard, as can 
be gauged from the fact that electoral competition has been claimed as one of the 
main causes of violent conflict in the region (Torres, 2007). While often thought of 
as a region marked by a weak state presence, it is more useful to understand this re-
gion as a highly exclusivist political order wherein dominant coalitions of elite play-
ers purposefully limit access to political authority and coercive resources (Kreuzer, 
2009). While these coalitions are typically a hybrid of formal and informal authority, 
elected officials in control of state institutions have gradually emerged as kingmak-
ers in this highly exclusivist political order, although they still have to negotiate with 
other authoritative actors. One of the key arenas of governance where these local 
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